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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a civil action brought by plaintiff/appellant Geri Pasquin ("Mrs. 
Pasquin") for declaratory relief (relating to her allegation that she is a partner in Quality Parts, 
and has an interest in the assets thereof), breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice, breach of 
employment contract, intentional interference with employment contract and intentional 
infliction of emotion distress. 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court based upon 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)(j)(1995 Sup.) 
and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The order granting summary judgment to the Estate of Kory Pasquin ("Pasquin Estate") 
was executed on October 21, 1997. The order granting summary judgment to John Pasquin, 
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. (the "Pasquin 
Defendants") was executed on November 3,1997. The order granting summary judgment to 
Thomas Duffin and Daniel Duffin (The "Duffin Defendants") was executed on November 17, 
1997. An amended order granting summary judgment to the Duffin Defendants was executed 
on November 26, 1997. The Order Denying Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Summary 
Judgment of Duffin Defendants was executed on December 19, 1997. The Minute Entry Ruling 
declaring plaintiffs objection to the language of the Duffin Defendants' proposed Summary 
Judgment to be untimely was executed on November 18, 1997. The Minute Entry Ruling 
denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and to Vacate the Summary Judgment of Pasquin 
Related Defendants was executed on December 18, 1997. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to rule that Mrs. Pasquin's claim of an 
interest in an oral partnership was barred under the Statute of Frauds in light of Mrs. Pasquin's 
sworn testimony that she became a partner immediately with the knowledge and consent of all 
partners, including John Pasquin? Related thereto, is an oral partnership agreement rendered 
unenforceable simply because the partnership contemplates existing longer than one year ? Are 
all oral partnerships rendered unenforceable if the partnerships operate or contemplate operating 
for more than one year? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory 
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, and Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, 
2. Was it error for Judge Fredericks to rule that there was no writing satisfying the 
Statute of Frauds with respect to Geri Pasquin's claim of an employment-for-life agreement 
given the undisputed fact that the entities against which this employment agreement was sought 
to be enforced, the Quality Parts partnership and its successor corporation, answered an 
interrogatory admitting the existence of the employment-for-life promise and John Pasquin's 
statement reaffirming and committing to honor said agreement? Does an express, written 
acknowledgment of what otherwise was an oral agreement by way of an interrogatory answer 
constitute a "writing" sufficient to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory 
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, and Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162. 
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3. Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to rule that the Statute of Frauds 
barred Mrs. Pasquin's partnership and employment-for-life claims given the fact that Mrs. 
Pasquin's opposing memoranda set forth verified statements of disputed facts which supported 
her claims that a factually intensive exception to the Statute of Frauds is present in this case, 
and/or that the defendants should be estopped for asserting said defense? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory 
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, and Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162. 
4. Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to essentially rule that even though 
Mrs. Pasquin had opposed the motions with detailed sworn statements of disputed facts, the 
defendants' motions were not opposed by any "affidavits?" Is a factual statement in a 
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, which is verified under oath, the 
equivalent of an "affidavit" under Rule 56? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory 
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's 
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs. 
Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin, 
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and 
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18, 1997 and to 
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211. 
4. Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to grant the motions for summary 
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judgment in light of the fact that Mrs. Pasquin's verified statements of disputed facts in 
opposition to the motions clearly demonstrated that there were material facts in dispute which 
needed to be resolved at trial? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory 
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's 
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs. 
Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin, 
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and 
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18,1997 and to 
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211. 
5. Was it reversible error for Judge Frederick's to deny Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) 
motion for more time to conduct discovery on the grounds that Mrs. Pasquin had failed to timely 
conduct discovery, when the facts were clear that (a) most relevant documents were in the 
possession of the defendants, especially the Pasquin Related Defendants, (b) Mrs. Pasquin had 
served discovery requests and notices of deposition upon the defendants months before, but (c) 
the defendants had failed to provide the requested discovery or submit themselves to deposition 
due to an assertion that John Pasquin had been injured and could not participate in discovery? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of 
Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's 
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs. 
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Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin, 
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and 
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18, 1997 and to 
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211. 
6. Did Judge Fredericks incorrectly construe and apply the rules for computation of 
time with respect to the filing of Mrs. Pasquin's objection to the language of the Pasquin 
Defendants' summary judgment? 
Preserved for appeal in Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry 
Dated November 18,1997 and to Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed 
Summary Judgment, R. 208-211 
7. Was it error for Judge Fredericks to deny Mrs. Pasquin's Motion to Reconsider 
and Vacate the order granting the Pasquin Defendants summary judgment? 
Preserved for appeal in Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry 
Dated November 18, 1997 and to Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed 
Summary Judgment, R. 208-211 
8. Was it error for Judge Fredericks to grant orders dismissing all of Mrs. Pasquin's 
claims against the defendants even though the defendants' Statute of Frauds and other challenges 
were dispositive as to certain of Mrs. Pasquin's claims? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of 
Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda 
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's 
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs. 
5 
Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin, 
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and 
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18,1997 and to 
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211. 
Standard of Review: The granting of the motions for summary judgment was based 
upon issues of law, and the Supreme Court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of 
the legal issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). This 
Court determines "whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of fact." State v. Ferre. 784 P. 2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989). The denial of Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motions should be reviewed to 
determine of the trial court abused its discretion, with deference given to the trial court's 
determinations unless they were clearly erroneous. 
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Mrs. Pasquin believes that the proper interpretation and application of the following 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and/or regulations to this appeal may well 
be determinative: 
Constitutional provisions: None. 
Statutes: 
U.C.A. 25-5-4 "Certain agreements void unless in written and signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement. 
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U.C.A. 48-1-15 "Rules determining rights and duties of partners. 
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be 
determined, subject to any agreement between, by the following rules: 
(7) No person can become a member of the partnership without the 
consent of all the partners. 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order... and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.... 
(b) Service: How made. (1) Whenever under these rules service is 
required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the 
service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is 
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by 
delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address .... 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time 
thereafter.... 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed 
by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, 
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or 
allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right 
or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
Rule 12(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, 
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any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 56 Summary Judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. ... The [summary] judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.... 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to 
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-501 (2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the movant 
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relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portion of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in 
the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
(2) Copies of the proposed ... orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and 
counsel within five days after service. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case involves allegations by Mrs. Pasquin that she was asked by her son Kory 
Pasquin, with the knowledge and consent of her ex-husband and Kory's father, John Pasquin, to 
join them as a partner in Quality Parts and to come to work for the business. After she became a 
partner, she began working for Quality Parts for minimum wage only and worked diligently to 
build the business. Mrs. Pasquin was promised by her partners, Kory and John, that she would 
be employed for life, and receive salary and benefits commensurate with that received by the 
other partners. The business conducted by the partnership was later incorporated, and Mrs. 
Pasquin was assured by Kory and John that her partnership interest would carry over into the 
corporation. Shortly thereafter, Kory Pasquin was killed in a boating accident. After Kory's 
death, John Pasquin asked Mrs. Pasquin to attend a meeting at the offices of Quality Parts' 
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attorneys, the defendants' Duffm. In this meeting, John asserted for the first time that Mrs. 
Pasquin can ever remember that she was not an owner in the business. The business' accountant, 
Boyd Simper, who was present in the meeting, objected that "Geri is a part of the company." 
John acknowledged that Mrs. Pasquin had been promised lifetime employment, and stated that 
he, Quality Parts and Quality Transport would honor that commitment and agreement. 
When Mrs. Pasquin refused to agree that she was not an owner in the business, the 
defendants took various actions which Mrs. Pasquin believes were wrongful. She filed the 
instant suit seeking a determination of her rights in the partnership, the new successor 
corporation, and the assets of both of them, and to her promised lifetime employment; seeking 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty by her partners, John and Kory (via Kory's Estate); seeking 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty by what she believed were her attorneys, the Duffins; 
seeking damages for breach of her employment agreement arising from the partnership's and/or 
new corporation's failure to pay her promised wages, failure to give her promised perquisites, 
and failure to withhold and/or pay her taxes, among other things; seeking damages against 
certain individuals for intentional interference with her contract with the partnership and/or the 
new corporation; and seeking damages for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. 
Mrs. Pasquin served sets of discovery requests upon the defendants in the Spring of 1997, 
and then notices of the defendants' depositions. The Pasquin Defendants answered Mrs. 
Pasquin's interrogatories admitting that Kory Pasquin had asked Mrs. Pasquin to come to work 
for the business and had promised her employment-for-life, and that John Pasquin, in the 
meeting at the Duffins' offices referred to above, had admitted the existence of this agreement 
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and reaffirmed it. The Duffin Defendants tendered the production of what limited documents 
that they had, but before any documents were produced by the partnership and new corporation, 
and before depositions could be taken, defendant John Pasquin suffered serious head injuries in a 
fall from the roof of the businesses' building. The Pasquin Defendants requested several open-
ended extensions of time to produce documents and to appear at depositions until John Pasquin 
recovered enough to assist in that discovery. 
Before Mrs. Pasquin could obtain access to these potentially critical business documents, 
or take essential depositions, the Pasquin Estate filed a motion for summary judgment. The 
motion was no supported by any affidavits. It cited only to portions of Mrs. Pasquin's 
complaint, and then claimed that Mrs. Pasquin could not prevail on any of her claims because the 
Statute of Frauds barred the enforcement of oral agreements which take more than one year to 
perform. Specifically, the Pasquin Estate claimed that the oral partnership and employment-for-
life agreement alleged by Mrs. Pasquin in her complaint both required more than one year to 
perform, such that claims related thereto were barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
The Duffin Defendants (the attorneys), joined in the Pasquin Estate's motion, with no 
separate memorandum or statement of undisputed fact. The Duffin Defendants did, however, 
submit affidavits from Thomas and Daniel Duffin. These affidavits stated that these attorneys 
had never performed services directly for Mrs. Pasquin, that when they performed services for 
the partnership and new corporation they did not know or believe that they were providing 
services to Mrs. Pasquin, that there were no writings memorializing or documenting Mrs. 
Pasquin's claims that she was a partner in Quality Parts or that she had an employment-for-life 
agreement with the partnership and/or new corporation. 
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Mrs. Pasquin filed a Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory Pasquin's Motion 
for Summary Judgment which contained a "Statement of Disputed Facts." Rather than submit a 
separate affidavit restating the same facts, Mrs. Pasquin signed a sworn statement verifying 
under the penalty of perjury the truthfulness and accuracy of the statements made in her 
Statement of Disputed Facts. This verified memorandum in opposition disputed the Pasquin 
Estate's brief statements of fact and asserted that the partnership interest had been granted to 
Mrs. Pasquin immediately, and with the knowledge and consent of John Pasquin, such that the 
Statute of Frauds was not even applicable. Further, Mrs. Pasquin argued that the Pasquin 
Defendants' answers to interrogatories constituted a writing which sufficiently acknowledged 
and memorialized the employment-for-life agreement to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds. Mrs. Pasquin finally pointed out that there were claims for relief against the Pasquin 
Estate and other defendants with respect to which the Statute of Frauds defense asserted by the 
Pasquin Estate did not even apply. Mrs. Pasquin attached copies of documents and the 
interrogatory answers which she asserted supported her averments of fact and arguments of law. 
Mrs. Pasquin filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Duffm's Joinder To The 
Estate of Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion. This 
memorandum incorporated by reference Her memorandum in opposition to the Pasquin Estate's 
motion, and made the additional arguments (1) that the agreement by the partners, Kory and 
John, to make Mrs. Pasquin a partner could be and was oral, (2) that for the purposes of the 
motions for summary judgment, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that she was in fact so made a 
partner with the knowledge and consent of John Pasquin had to be assumed to be true for the 
purposes of the motions; (3) that the factually intensive doctrines of "partial performance" and 
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"equitable estoppel," as supported by Mrs. Pasquin's sworn factual averments (which were also 
required to be assumed to be true for the purposes of the motions), precluded the granting of 
summary judgment on the defendants' Statute of Frauds defense; (4) that the Statue of Frauds 
requires only that there be some writing which clearly references the claimed agreement which is 
by the party to be charged; and (5) that the partnership's and new corporation's signed 
interrogatory answers which acknowledged an employment-for-life agreement and that these 
entities had reaffirmed that agreement in a meeting at the attorneys' offices satisfied the Statute 
of Frauds. 
The Pasquin Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, submitted a 
memorandum of points and authorities which incorporated therein the arguments of the Pasquin 
Estate. The Pasquin Defendants' memorandum contained no statement of undisputed facts. 
However, the Pasquin Defendants submitted an affidavit from John Pasquin in which he 
disputed Mrs. Pasquin's version of the facts. The Pasquin Defendants' memorandum incredibly 
argued that part of Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony related to statements and promises made 
primarily by Kory Pasquin, and that since Kory is now deceased, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn 
testimony in these regards should not be believed. (Attached hereto as Exhibit A are copies of 
affidavits of third-parties with respect to what these individuals heard Kory Pasquin promise 
Mrs. Pasquin) The Pasquin Defendants also asserted that since John Pasquin's affidavit 
disputed Mrs. Pasquin's sworn statements of disputed fact, the Pasquin Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment should be granted. These two arguments are totally inconsistent with the 
legal requirement that the facts have to be construed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motions for summary judgment, and that if the moving parties' material facts are 
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disputed, the motions must be denied. 
The Pasquin Defendants' memorandum also argued that an employment-for-life 
agreement is very unusual and can only be established under unusual circumstances. Mrs. 
Pasquin appreciated the fact that these defendants' memorandum acknowledged that 
employment-for-life agreements have been found enforceable. Mrs. Pasquin's memorandum in 
opposition to this motion incorporated her prior memoranda in opposition to the other 
defendants' joined motion for summary judgment, and argued that the facts that she verified 
under oath satisfied the requirements for finding an employment-for-life agreement as set forth in 
the cases cited by the Pasquin Defendants. 
The reply memoranda of the Duffin Defendants and the Pasquin Defendants claimed 
incorrectly, among other things, that Mrs. Pasquin had not submitted "affidavits" opposing the 
defendants' statement of undisputed fact. This was an interesting argument given that (1) only 
the Pasquin Estate's initial memorandum had a "statement of undisputed fact," (2) the Pasquin 
Estate's statement referred only to paragraphs in Mrs. Pasquin's own complaint and was not 
accompanied by any affidavits whatsoever, and (3) Mrs. Pasquin's various memoranda either set 
forth separately and/or through incorporation by reference detailed "statements of disputed 
facts," verified under oath and penalty of perjury by Mrs. Pasquin, which were the functional 
equivalent of "opposing affidavits." 
Rather than deal with the defendants' joined motions at the same time, and even while 
Mrs. Pasquin was still briefing the later-filed motions, Judge Frederick began ruling on the 
motions separately ~ initially issuing a minute order granting the Pasquin Estate's motion "for 
the reasons set forth in the memoranda," and ultimately granting all the other defendants' 
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motions. Mrs. Pasquin objected to the language of the proposed orders granting summary 
judgment to the Duffm Defendants and the Pasquin Defendants. Judge Frederick never ruled on 
her objection to the Duffm Defendants' summary judgment. Judge Frederick signed the Pasquin 
Defendants' proposed order before the time had even run for Mrs. Pasquin to submit her 
objections thereto, and then ruled that Mrs. Pasquin's objection had been filed too late. Mrs. 
Pasquin disagreed with Judge Frederick's application of the Rules relating to the computation of 
the time for filing objections, and therefore filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Vacate 
with respect to the Pasquin Defendants' summary judgment. Judge Fredericks denied this 
motion. Mrs. Pasquin filed this appeal seeking to reverse the granting of all of the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mrs. Pasquin was approached by her son, Kory Pasquin, and asked to come to 
work for and be a partner in Quality Parts with him and his father, Mrs. Pasquin's ex-husband, 
John Pasquin. Kory told her that he, Kory, was handling sales, that John was handling the 
service/repair part of the business, and that Geri would handle the office. John Pasquin was 
aware of and consented to Mrs. Pasquin becoming a partner in Quality Parts (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem."), Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 
87, 94-95; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Duffins' Joinder To The Estate 
of Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion ("Plaintiffs Duffin 
Opposition Mem."), p. 2, R. 144; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' John 
Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. Motion 
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for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion ("Plaintiffs Pasquin Defendants Opposition 
Mem."), p. 2, R. 156) 
2. Mrs. Pasquin agreed to become a partner and came to work for Quality Parts at 
only minimum wage because she was told that she was a "partner" and that the partnership 
needed to conserve money. Mrs. Pasquin's wages were not raised for three years. The 
partnership paid for her health insurance, her car insurance and gas for her car. The partnership 
did not withhold any taxes from her wages, but at the end of each year prepared her tax returns 
and paid all of her accrued taxes. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., Statement of 
Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87,94-95; Plaintiffs Duffin Opposition Mem., pp. 2-3, R. 
144-45; Plaintiffs Pasquin Defendants Opposition Mem., pp. 2-5, R. 156-59) 
3. Mrs. Pasquin's services as manager of the office substantially contributed to the 
success of Quality Parts. Her fiscal conservativeness enabled the partnership to save enough 
money to purchase the land and building where the business is currently being operated. 
Although Mrs. Pasquin had frequent run ins with John Pasquin, Kory constantly reassured her 
that her contributions were essential to the success of the partnership's business and that she was 
an important and valued partner; and, that when the business was sold, she would be able to 
retire on her share of the proceeds. Kory also told Mrs. Pasquin that she, like John and himself, 
were "employees for life" — that she would have a job at a commensurate salary and equivalent 
benefits as himself and John for as long as she wanted. This induced Mrs. Pasquin to take the 
job, become a partner, and work for low wages for years to build the business and make it 
successful. Kory confirmed these promises and representations that he had made to Mrs. Pasquin 
to several other people as well (Exhibit A attached hereto). (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition 
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Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 94-95; Plaintiffs Duffm Opposition 
Mem., pp. 2-3, R. 144-45; Plaintiffs Pasquin Defendants Opposition Mem., pp. 2-5, R. 156-59) 
4. In early 1996, Kory and John incorporated the business, forming Quality 
Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. Mrs. Pasquin was led to believe by John and Kory that this 
was something that the lawyers recommended and that her interest would be taken care of 
therein. She trusted Kory and his promises. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., 
Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 95-6) 
5. In the Fall of 1996, Kory Pasquin was killed in a boating accident, without any 
will and with two illegitimate minor children, by different mothers, as his direct heirs. 
(Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 
96) 
6. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Pasquin was called to attend a meeting at the offices of 
the Duffin Defendants (who had been the partnership's attorneys, and had organized the 
corporation). In this meeting, the attorneys said that John and Kory had been the only 
shareholders of the corporation. The partnership and corporation's accountant protested, stating 
that Mrs. Pasquin was a part of "the company." Mrs. Pasquin's daughter, Julie Flarrity, was in 
attendance at the meeting and objected and stated that Kory had told her many times that Mrs. 
Pasquin was an "equal partner" in the business and would be able to "retire when the business is 
sold." John Pasquin acknowledged in front of all present that Kory had promised Mrs. Pasquin 
continuous employment, and that this promise would be honored. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate 
Opposition Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 97) 
7. However, John Pasquin refused to acknowledge that Mrs. Pasquin should have a 
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one-third interest in Quality Parts and Quality Transport. Further, John Pasquin caused Quality 
Parts and/or Quality Transport to thereafter reduce Mrs. Pasquin's wages, refuse to pay her 
insurance any more, and refuse to prepare her tax returns and pay her taxes when they came due -
- all in violation of prior practice and agreements. John Pasquin told Mrs. Pasquin that he had 
done all of the foregoing at the direction and insistence of his attorneys, the Duffin Defendants. 
(Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 
97-98) 
8. As a result, Mrs. Pasquin was forced to file suit seeking a determination of her 
interest in the partnership and successor corporation and their assets; seeking an accounting; 
seeking a declaration that she is entitled to employment-for-life as promised and agreed; seeking 
damages for breach of her employment agreement (due to the reduction in her wages, to the 
failure to pay her insurance, and failure to accrue, account for and pay her taxes); seeking 
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress; seeking damages against the attorney's 
for malpractice (if she is a partner, they were her attorneys and their actions were antagonistic to 
her interests); seeking damages against the attorneys and John Pasquin for inducing the business 
to breach their employment agreements with her; among other things. (Complaint, R. 1-15) 
9. Mrs. Pasquin served discovery requests upon all the defendants. R. 42,44, 58, 59, 
67 The Pasquin Defendants answered the interrogatories and admitted that Mrs. Pasquin had 
been promised lifetime employment and that John Pasquin on behalf of the partnership and new 
corporation had reaffirmed that agreement in the meeting at the Duffins' office referred to in 
paragraph 6 above. R. 66,108-112 The Duffin Defendants tendered what little documents they 
possessed to Mrs. Pasquin, but the remaining defendants, despite repeated demands, did not 
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tender or produce any documents to Mrs. Pasquin. Further, John Pasquin did not appear at his 
deposition because he had an accident, suffered head injuries and claimed that he was not well-
enough to appear and/or participate in discovery. R. 137,141,146-7,159. 
10. The Pasquin Estate filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that since the 
agreement by which Mrs. Pasquin became a partner in Quality Parts was oral, and since the 
employment-for-life agreement was also oral, the Statute of Frauds barred Mrs. Pasquin's suit. 
This motion was not supported by any affidavits in support, but was instead based solely upon 
references to the factual averments in Mrs. Pasquin's own complaint (Pasquin Estate Motion and 
Memorandum, R. 74-79) 
11. Mrs. Pasquin opposed the motion by (i) incorporating by reference in her 
statement of disputed facts all of the detailed allegations in her complaint, and by setting forth 
certain other material disputed facts, (ii) by verifying under oath and penalty of perjury the 
truthfulness of the incorporated allegations from her complaint as well as the additional factual 
averments in her memorandum in opposition. Based upon those detailed and sworn/verified 
"disputed facts," Mrs. Pasquin argued that the motion for summary judgment should be denied 
because (iii) the partnership was formed instantly (and therefore did not fall under the statute of 
frauds, (iv) there was a writing confirming that the employment-for-life agreement had been 
made (the Pasquin Defendants' answers to interrogatories in which John Pasquin admitted that 
Kory Pasquin had promised Mrs. Pasquin employment for life and that this promise/agreement 
would be honored), and (v) that even if the agreements were somehow subject to the Statutes of 
Frauds, there were various factually intensive exceptions to the Statute applicable to the instant 
case which precluded the granting of summary judgment. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition 
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Mem., R. 87-112) 
12. The Duffm Defendants, attorneys Thomas and Daniel Duffin, joined in the 
Pasquin Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 80-86 Mrs. Pasquin opposed the Duffin 
Defendants' joinder on the same basis as previously argued, plus by emphasizing that Mrs. 
Pasquin's sworn statement of disputed facts supported the "partial performance" and "estoppel" 
exceptions or defenses to the Statute of Frauds. Mrs. Pasquin also argued that there were causes 
of action (such as for breach of employment agreement with respect to wages, benefits and taxes; 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and interference with contract, etc.) which were did 
not rely on finding of an oral partnership and of the oral employment-for-life agreement for their 
validity, and therefore could not be dismissed solely on the "statute of frauds" argument. R. 143-
148 
13. The Pasquin Defendants (the two Pasquins, the partnership and the corporation) 
joined in the Pasquin Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Pasquin Defendants' 
memorandum incredibly argued that part of Mrs. Pasquin's testimony related to statements and 
promises made primarily by Kory Pasquin, and that since Kory is now deceased, Mrs. Pasquin's 
sworn testimony somehow should not be believed. These defendants also asserted that since 
John Pasquin's affidavit disputed Mrs. Pasquin's sworn statements of fact, the Pasquin 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. R. 121-130 Mrs. Pasquin 
opposed it on the same bases as against both of the other motions for summary judgment, and 
with her detailed sworn statements of disputed facts. R. 155-162 
14. The Duffin and Pasquin Defendants filed reply briefs in which they asserted that 
Mrs. Pasquin had not filed an "opposing affidavit" ~ ignoring the fact that a verified factual 
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statement disputed is the same as an affidavit - and claiming in part that summary judgment 
should be granted as a result thereof. R. 135-142,165-169 
15. Judge Fredericks granted each of the motions for summary judgment "for the 
reasons set forth" in the moving parties'memoranda. R. 153,172 
16. Mrs. Pasquin filed an objection to the proposed order granting summary judgment 
to the Duffm Defendants, R. 179-180 which was never ruled on. 
17. On Thursday, October 23, 1997, the Pasquin Defendants mailed their proposed 
order granting summary judgment to Mrs. Pasquin. R. 187-88. Under CJA, 4-504, objections are 
to be submitted within five days. Under URCP 6, if the time period is less than seven days, 
intervening weekends and holidays are not counted. Also under URCP 6, since the proposed 
order was mailed, three days are added to the time period - essentially the proposed order is not 
considered served for the first three business days. Given these rules, Mrs. Pasquin had until on 
or before Tuesday, November 4,1997, to submit her objection. On Monday, November 3, 1997, 
Mrs. Pasquin mailed and faxed her Objection to this proposed order to the defendants, and 
mailed it to the Court for filing. R. 189-191, and Exhibit B attached hereto (which contains 
copies of the FAX confirmation sheets showing that the objection was faxed to the defendants on 
November 3, 1997). Judge Fredericks executed the Pasquin Defendants' proposed order granting 
summary judgment on November 3,1997, before the time for objecting had even run. R. 186 
Judge Fredericks issued a Minute Entry on November 18, 1997 in which he ruled that Mrs. 
Pasquin's Objection to the Pasquin Defendants' proposed order was "untimely." R. 206 
18. Mrs. Pasquin filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the summary judgment 
granted to the Duffm Defendants on the grounds that the objection had in fact been timely filed. 
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R. 208-209 
19. Judge Fredericks denied the motion for reconsideration. R. 240 Mrs. Pasquin 
filed her notice of appeal. R. 221-222. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The motions for summary judgment should never have been granted The Duffin 
Defendants were simply wrong when they asserted in their Reply brief that Mrs. Pasquin cannot 
incorporate the allegations of her complaint and then verify them under oath as part of her 
statements of disputed fact. A verified statement of disputed fact, for the purposes of a motion 
for summary judgment, is the functional equivalent of an affidavit. Mrs. Pasquin's verified 
statements of disputed fact were detailed and not only supported her claims for relief, but also 
disputed the defendants' assertions of material fact. With the material facts in dispute, it was 
clearly inappropriate for Judge Frederick to have granted the motions for summary judgment. 
The Pasquin Estate's original motion for summary judgment (which was joined in by all 
the other defendants) was based solely on the allegations in Mrs. Pasquin's complaint, and 
claimed that even if those allegations were true Mrs. Pasquin's claims for relief were barred by 
the Statute of Frauds (essentially a motion for judgment on the pleadings). That aspect of the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment relating to a purely legal Statute of Frauds challenge 
to Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims should have been summarily denied because oral 
partnerships are not rendered unenforceable simply because the partnerships contemplate being 
in existence longer than one year. In the face of Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that she had 
been admitted as a partner "immediately," the Pasquin Estate attempted to argue in its Reply that 
Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims should still be dismissed because John Pasquin did not consent 
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to the admission of Mrs. Pasquin as a partner. However, this assertion of fact was not supported 
by any affidavit submitted by the Pasquin Estate ~ which should have barred the Estate from 
even making this argument. But, more importantly, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that John 
Pasquin had in fact consented to her admission as a partner completely disputed this factual 
assertion. Mrs. Pasquin's version of the facts in this regard must be assumed to be true for the 
purposes of the motions. Consequently, the defendants' motions for summary judgment relating 
to Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims should have been denied. 
With respect to Mrs. Pasquin's oral employment-for-life claim, the defendants argued 
that this claim is clearly unenforceable without a writing under the Statute of Frauds because any 
such agreement would clearly involve performance over a period of more than one year. 
However, Mrs. Pasquin pointed out in her very first opposing memorandum that there was in fact 
a writing signed by the partnership and corporation — their answers to interrogatories — which 
admitted that Mrs. Pasquin had been promised lifetime employment and that John Pasquin had 
reaffirmed that agreement in the meeting at the Duffin attorneys' office. Those answers to 
interrogatories, as a matter of law, satisfied the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The 
defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to the employment-for-life agreement 
should have been denied for this reason alone. 
Even if the Statute of Frauds otherwise somehow appeared to be applicable and a bar to 
Mrs. Pasquin's claims in these two claimed regards, there are at least two recognized exceptions 
to the Statute of Frauds: "partial performance" and "estoppel." If Mrs. Pasquin's opposing 
verified statements of disputed fact would support a finding by a jury that either of these 
exceptions applied in this case, the motions for summary judgment should have been denied. 
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Mrs. Pasquin's sworn statements of disputed fact clearly supported these exceptions as argued by 
Mrs. Pasquin in her opposing memoranda. It was reversible error therefore to grant the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
Even if Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims and employment-for-life claims had been 
barred by the Statute of Frauds, her other claims should not have been dismissed. If Mrs. 
Pasquin was not entitled to be an employee for life, she still was an employee at will who was 
entitled to be paid currently and prior to termination pursuant to the parties' agreement as to 
remuneration and perquisites due her. She certainly should have been allowed to sue for breach 
of her employment agreement as to these issues. She is also entitled to seek damages for her 
claims that the partnership and/or new corporation were improperly induced to breach their 
agreements with her with respect to the payment of her salary and taxes. She is also entitled to 
pursue her claims for damages arising from the alleged intentional and/or negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. All of these claims were improperly dismissed regardless of the outcome of 
the Statute of Frauds defense and whether or not there was an enforceable oral partnership 
interest or employment-for-life agreement.. 
Judge Fredericks prematurely executed the Pasquin Defendants' summary judgment 
(because he did not wait for the time to run for Mrs. Pasquin to submit her objections thereto), 
and then incorrectly ruled that Mrs. Pasquin's objection thereto was untimely. This ruling and 
Judge Fredericks' ruling denying Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration and to Vacate 
incorrectly applied the rules to the facts and should be reversed. 
At the very least, Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motions should have been granted and a 
ruling on the defendants' motions delayed until after the Pasquin Defendants had produced the 
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requested documents to the plaintiff and submitted themselves for their previously noticed 
depositions. It was an abuse of discretion and clear error for Judge Fredericks to have denied 
plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal seeks reversal of Judge Frederick's orders granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants. Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56 (c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a matter of law, 
this Court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P. 2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). This Court determines "whether 
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that 
there were no disputed issues of material fact." State v. Ferre. 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) 
The trial court's determination as to whether an objection was timely or not involves the 
application of law. Similarly, whether a verified statement of disputed facts is the functional 
equivalent of an affidavit is a question of law. Such legal detenninations are given no deference 
but are reviewed for correctness. 
Because a motion for summary judgment denies a litigant its day in court, the trial court 
must carefully scrutinize the documents submitted. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 
1976) If, after such scrutiny, the "evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if 
resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law, " 
the motion must be denied. Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Where 
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reasonable minds could differ, a genuine issue of fact exists. Id In addition, all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party -- Mrs. Pasquin. Beehive Brick Co. 
v.Robinson Brick Co., 780 P. 2d 827 (Utah App. 1989). 
A proper application of these rules and cases to the facts herein requires the reversal of 
Judge Fredericks' orders as requested by Mrs. Pasquin herein. 
II. MRS. PASQUIN'S VERIFIED STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
WAS PROPER AND CLEARLY SUPPORTED HER CLAIMS AND 
OPERATED TO EFFECTIVELY DISPUTE THE DEFENDANTS' 
MATERIAL FACTS 
A. It Was Procedurally and Substantively Impermissible for the 
Defendants to Attempt to Contradict, and for Judge Frederick 
to Ignore, the Allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's Complaint 
The Pasquin Estate's first motion for summary judgment, joined in by all the other 
defendants, began as essentially a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Pasquin Estate did 
not submit any affidavits. It merely referenced the allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint, and 
argued that even assuming that those allegations were true, Mrs. Pasquin's claims were barred by 
the Statute of Frauds. As such, the trial court and the parties were required to assume to be true 
all of the allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint. URCP, Rule 12(c) 
Each of the other defendants joined in this original motion for summary judgment. None 
of their memoranda contained any new or additional "statement of undisputed facts" sections in 
the form required by CJA, 4-501(2)(a). All of the motions for summary judgment were bound, 
therefore, by the Pasquin Estate's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" - which as indicated above 
referred only to the allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint. Consequently, procedurally and 
substantively, none of the defendants should have been allowed to submit any affidavits 
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attempting to contradict the factual allegations in Mrs. Pasquin's complaint - if one is required 
to assume the allegations to be true, it is not logically possible nor substantively permissible to 
attempt to dispute them. 
CJA 4-501(2)(a) and (b) are instructive in this regard and state in part: 
(a) The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as 
to which movant contends no genuine issue exists.... 
(b)... All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported 
by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose 
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
Furthermore, URCP 56(e) states in part that: 
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading...." 
A party moving for summary judgment must set forth all material facts upon which the 
motion depends in his or her statement of undisputed facts. Otherwise, the opposing party is 
under no obligation to dispute the same. It is procedurally improper to submit facts only in 
affidavits purporting to support a motion for summary judgment without having first set them 
forth in the movants' statement of undisputed facts. 
This means that none of the motions should have gone beyond a determination of the 
purely legal issue of whether, assuming Mrs. Pasquin's factual allegations to be true, her claims 
were barred by the application of the Statute of Frauds. Mrs. Pasquin was entitled to rely upon 
the allegations of her complaint, whether verified or not, in opposing the motions. Judge 
Frederick's orders granting summary judgment must all be reversed because he did not clearly 
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and unequivocally keep the consideration of affidavit testimony which purported to contradict 
Mrs. Pasquin's version of the facts from affecting his decision making process. This is 
particularly demonstrated by the fact that if he had assumed Mrs. Pasquin's "Statement of 
Disputed Facts" to be true as required, he would have been required to deny the motions for 
summary judgment. 
B. It Was Not Improper For Mrs, Pasquin To Incorporate by Reference 
In Her Statement of Disputed Facts the Factual Averments of Her 
Complaint 
As argued in the previous section, it may well be that Mrs. Pasquin was procedurally not 
required to submit a true CJA 4-501(2)(b) "statement of disputed facts," since the original and 
subsequent motions for summary judgment on the face of their memoranda were in actuality 
motions for judgment on the pleadings. However, when the process became somewhat 
"polluted" by the defendants' submittal of affidavits purporting to contradict the factual 
allegations in Mrs. Pasquin's complaint, it was logical and certainly not improper for Mrs. 
Pasquin to specifically incorporate the allegations of her complaint by reference in the 
"Statement of Disputed Facts" section of her opposing memorandum. The defendants have not, 
nor can they, cite any rule or case holding which prohibits such an incorporation by reference. 
The defendants could have argued (but did not) the evidentiary sufficiency of the specific 
language incorporated by reference into the statement of disputed facts, but they cannot claim 
that one cannot incorporate matters by reference into such a statement. Incorporation by 
reference is a well-recognized and understood process in legal drafting. 
28 
C. A Sworn Verification of a Statement of Disputed Facts is the 
Functional Equivalent of Submitting An Affidavit Opposing 
Summary Judgment 
When Mrs. Pasquin formally verified the truthfulness of the allegations of her 
complaint under oath as a part of her verification of the "Statement of Disputed Facts," those 
allegations ceased to be "mere allegations ... of [her] pleadings." URCP 56(e) Rather, they 
became part of a sworn submittal of factual information in opposition to the motions for 
summary judgment — which is the functional equivalent of an opposing affidavit. It is well 
established that a verified statement of fact is the equivalent of an affidavit. It was reversible 
error for Judge Frederick to have entered orders granting the motions for summary judgment of 
the Duffin and Pasquin Defendants based in part upon the finding that Mrs. Pasquin had not 
properly opposed the factual bases of those motions. 
D. Mrs. Pasquin's Statements of Disputed Facts Sufficiently 
Supported Her Claims 
None of the motions for summary judgment challenged Mrs. Pasquin's claims for relief 
on any legal basis other than the application of the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the factual 
allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint were and are on their face sufficient to support Mrs. 
Pasquin's legal theories for relief. Consequently, absent a finding that the Statute of Frauds bars 
her claims, it would have been, and Mrs. Pasquin believes it was, reversible error to grant 
summary judgment dismissing her claims. 
E. Mrs. Pasquin's Statements of Disputed Facts Disputed all of the 
Defendants' Improper Affidavit Testimony 
Even though it should not have been allowed, the defendants attempted to assert facts via 
their various affidavits or otherwise upon which they argued that Judge Frederick could grant 
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their motions for summary judgment. However, Mrs. Pasquin's verified Statements of Disputed 
Facts clearly placed all of these factual matters in dispute such that the motions for summary 
judgment should have been denied. 
For example, the Pasquin Estate first attempted to argue that Mrs. Pasquin became a 
partner over time such that the Statute of Frauds should bar her suit. But, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn 
testimony contradicted this by stating that she was made a partner immediately. The Pasquin 
Estate then argued that even if Kory Pasquin had promised and/or attempted to make Mrs. 
Pasquin a partner in Quality Parts, Utah law requires that all partners consent to the admission of 
a new partner, and that John Pasquin (without any supporting affidavit) had not consented to 
Mrs. Pasquin becoming a partner. This statement of fact was disputed by Mrs. Pasquin's sworn 
testimony that John Pasquin was aware of and consented to her being admitted as a partner in 
Quality Parts. None of the motions for summary judgment could have been granted on the "lack 
of consent" grounds. 
The Duffin Defendants similarly submitted their affidavits purporting to establish that 
Mrs. Pasquin was never a partner in Quality Parts, that they never considered her a client, and 
that they were not aware of any document which purported to grant Mrs. Pasquin lifetime 
employment, among other things. Based thereon, they argued that Mrs. Pasquin could not 
prevail on her claims, including her claims against them for breach of fiduciary duty, interference 
with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn 
testimony states that she was made a partner, that she did consider them to be her attorneys, that 
she was promised lifetime employment, and such. Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony disputed all 
material facts argued by the Duffin Defendants in their motion. 
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The Pasquin Defendants similarly submitted an affidavit of John Pasquin in which he 
stated that he had never agreed to Mrs. Pasquin being a partner or shareholder in the new 
corporation, that she had always been nothing more than a mere employee of the partnership and 
new corporation, and that Mrs. Pasquin had in actuality been more of a "charity case" than a 
significant contributor to the business, and the like. Again, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony 
disputed all of these factual assertions. 
With all of these factual matters squarely placed in dispute, the motions for summary 
judgment could not and should not have been granted. Judge Frederick's orders granting 
summary judgment should be reversed. 
m . IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO RULE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THAT MRS. PASQUIN'S ORAL PARTNERSHIP CLAIMS WERE 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The Utah Statute of Frauds states in part as follows: 
U.C.A. 25-5-4 "Certain agreements void unless in written and signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement. 
The defendants all argued that this language barred Mrs. Pasquin from asserting that she had 
been granted an interest in the oral partnership, Quality Parts, ostensibly because the partnership 
contemplated existing and operating for more than a year. 
A. An Oral Partnership Is Not Rendered Unenforceable Simply Because 
it Contemplates Operating, or In Fact Does Operate, For Longer 
Than One Year 
The defendants' motions must be denied because they urge an improper construction of 
31 
the phrase "is not to be performed within one year." It is well-established law that partnerships 
can be oral and that the granting of an interest in a partnership can be oral. If such partnership 
agreements are rendered unenforceable simply because the parties are going to be and/or are 
partners for longer than one year, untold numbers of partnership agreements will be adversely 
affected. The answer lies in the phrase "agreement... to be perform within one year." A 
partnership can operate for longer than a year and a partner can become a partner for longer than 
one year. But a partner cannot enforce, for example, an agreement to become a partner which 
lasts longer than one year to perform and/or complete. It was reversible error to grant the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment simply because Mrs. Pasquin, Kory Pasquin and 
John Pasquin contemplated being partners in Quality Parts for longer than one year. 
B. Mrs. Pasquin's Sworn Averments That She Was Made Partner 
Immediately, and With the Knowledge and Consent of John Pasquin, 
Precluded The Granting of Summary Judgment 
Since Mrs. Pasquin's complaint and other sworn statements asserts that she became a 
partner in Quality Parts immediately, the agreement by which she became a partner was not one 
which was "not to be performed in one year." If Mrs. Pasquin's sworn version of the facts is 
assumed to be true (as it must), the Statute of Frauds is not even applicable. The orders granting 
summary judgment should therefore be reversed. 
C. Mrs. Pasquin Identified Legal Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, 
Supported by Her Sworn Statements of Disputed Facts, Which 
Precluded the Granting of Summary Judgment 
Even if the Statute of Frauds were applicable, there can be exceptions thereto. The 
verified complaint states that Mrs. Pasquin contributed her time and talents to the business after 
she was made a partner therein in reliance on the representations that she was a partner and 
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would have life-time employment upon terms essentially equivalent to that of Kory and John. 
Her compensation and tax returns were handled in a fashion that demonstrates the accuracy of 
these assertions. Assuming these facts for the purposes of the motions for summary judgment, a 
jury could reasonably find that the doctrines of "partial performance" and "equitable estoppel" 
precluded the defendants from prevailing on a Statute of Frauds defense. As the Court stated in 
Jacobsonv.Cox. 202 P. 2d 714 (Utah 1949): 
"Closely allied to the principles of protection against the assertion of the statute of frauds 
to accomplish a fraud upon the party who has acted in reliance upon an oral contract or the 
assertion of the statute as a shield to protect fraud is the doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute. 
It is universally conceded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to preclude a 
party to a contract from asserting the unenforceability of a contract by reason of the fact that it is 
not in writing as required by the statute of frauds. As is often said, the statute of frauds may be 
rendered inoperative by an estoppel in pais. Where one has acted to his detriment solely in 
reliance on an oral agreement, an estoppel may be raised to defeat the defense of the statute of 
frauds. This is based upon the principle established in equity, and applying in every transaction 
where the statute is invoked, that the statute of frauds, having been enacted for the purpose of 
preventing fraud, shall not be made the instrument of shielding, protecting, or aiding the party 
who relies upon it in the perpetration of a fraud or in the consummation of a fraudulent scheme. 
It is called into operation to defeat what would be an unconscionable use of the statute, and 
guards against the utilization of the statute as a means for defrauding innocent persons who have 
been induced or permitted to change their position in reliance upon oral agreements within its 
operation. Id. at 722-23. 
In the Jacobson case the Court found that the parties were all familiar with the agreement that 
had been made, had acted for years in accordance with said agreements, and as such were 
estopped from even raising a Statute of Frauds defense. 
As Mrs. Pasquin argued in her opposing memoranda, Mrs. Pasquin could prevail against 
the defendants' Statute of Frauds defense at trial herein on these theories. She acted in reliance 
upon the representations that she was a partner in Quality Parts. John was at all times aware of 
and consented to Kory making Mrs. Pasquin a partner and promising her life-time employment 
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(as acknowledged by the interrogatory answers). Mrs. Pasquin was treated as a partner both 
before and after the formation of the corporation - up until Kory died and John seized control of 
the corporation. All of these facts were required to be assumed to be true for the purposes of the 
motions for summary judgment. If true, a fraud and great injustice would be perpetrated if the 
defendants are allowed to assert the Statute of Frauds to assist them in depriving Mrs. Pasquin of 
the fruits of her labor and that which she was promised and for which she had worked for many 
years. Further, upon summary judgment, these fact-intensive issues cannot be and should not 
have been resolved in defendants' favor. They can only be decided at trial. The trier of fact must 
be allowed to determine if the defendants' Statue of Frauds defense is barred by estoppel and the 
parties' partial performance. 
IV. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO RULE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THAT MRS. PASQUIN'S LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS WERE 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
A. The Pasquin Defendants9 Answers to Interrogatories Satisfied the 
Statute of Frauds With Respect to the Issue of Mrs. Pasquin's 
Lifetime Employment Claims 
Mrs. Pasquin's lifetime employment claims clearly could be affected by the application 
of the Statute of Frauds because that was an agreement which was to be performed over a period 
of time longer than one year. However, the Pasquin Defendants' interrogatory answers satisfied 
the requirements of the Statute. They acknowledge that Kory did promise Mrs. Pasquin lifetime 
employment, and were signed by a representative of the partnership and the new corporation. It 
was reversible error for Judge Frederick to rule that the Statute of Frauds barred Mrs. Pasquin's 
claims relating to a lifetime employment agreement when the defendants own answers to 
interrogatories referenced and acknowledged the same. 
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B. Mrs. Pasquin Identified Legal Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, 
Supported by Her Sworn Statements of Disputed Facts, Which 
Precluded the Granting of Summary Judgment 
For the reasons set forth in section III. C , above, it was reversible error for Judge 
Frederick to rule that Mrs. Pasquin could not prevail at trial against a Statute of Fraud defense as 
to her claims to lifetime employment. 
Further, the Pasquin Defendants' memorandum itself stated that: 
"Under what circumstances, one may wonder, could a lifetime employment be found. In 
Green v. Oliver Realty, Inc.. 526 A. 2d 1192 (PA. Super. 1987), the court found a contract where 
the employee agreed to work for less than union scale in exchange for a contract for employment 
for life. The court concluded that although a promise of lifetime employment should not be 
enforced merely on the basis of the promise itself, such a promise would be enforced if the 
surrounding circumstances indicated that the parties truly intended to overcome the presumption 
of employment-at-will or if there were additional considerations." R. 128 
Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony satisfied the requirements of the defendants' own cited 
case. She worked extraordinary hours at only minimum wage rather than market rate. Further, 
the Pasquin Defendants' answers to interrogatories clearly indicate that "the parties intended to 
overcome the presumption of employment at will." Not only do these interrogatory answers 
acknowledge that the promise had been made, but they docment the Pasquin Defendants' 
reaffirmation of the agreement at the meeting at the Duffin Defendants' office. These factually 
intensive issues can only be resolved at trial. 
V. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO DISMISS ALL OF MRS. PASQUIN'S 
CLAIMS 
Even if the Statute of Frauds were a bar to Mrs. Pasquin's claims to a partnership interest 
and in lifetime employment, Mrs. Pasquin was nevertheless an employee of the business and 
entitled to be paid at all times prior to the termination of her employment strictly in accordance 
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with the parties' agreements as to remuneration and perquisites. Mrs. Pasquin was entitled to be 
free from having individuals induce her employer to breach her employment agreement in these 
regards. Mrs. Pasquin also was entitled to be free from being subjected to the intentional or 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Mrs. Pasquin's complaint alleged that the defendants 
breached her contract with respect to wages, perquisites and the withholding, accounting and 
payment of her taxes. Mrs. Pasquin's complaint alleged that certain defendants interfered with 
her employment agreement and induced her employer to breach the agreement in these regards. 
Finally, Mrs. Pasquin's complaint alleged that the defendants committed acts which constituted 
the intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. It was reversible error for these 
claims to have been dismissed through the granting of the defendants' motions for summary. 
VI. MRS. PASQUIN'S OBJECTION TO THE PASQUIN DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT 
UNTIMELY 
With respect to the timeliness of Mrs. Pasquin's objection to the proposed order granting 
the Pasquin Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the following chronology and argument 
are illustrative: 
1. The proposed order was mailed to Mrs. Pasquin on October 23, 1997 (see mailing 
certificate attached to the proposed order); 
2. CJA, Rule 4-504 requires plaintiff to submit any objection within "five days;" 
3. Under URCP, Rule 6 (a), whenever a time period "is less than seven days, 
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation;" 
4. Under URCP, Rule 6(e), since the proposed order was mailed, three days are 
added to the time period; 
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5. This means that Mrs. Pasquin had eight (5+3) days to object, and weekends and 
holidays are not counted — which means that the objection was not due until Tuesday, 
November, 4, 1997; 
6. Mrs. Pasquin served her objection upon defendants by mail and fax on Monday, 
November 3,1997 (before the deadline) in conformance with URCP, Rule 5(b) ("Service by mail 
is complete upon mailing")(see mailing certificate attached to Mrs. Pasquin's objection and 
Exhibit B attached hereto); 
7. The plaintiff mailed the objection to the court on November 3, 1997 in 
conformance with URCP, Rule 5(d)("All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter" 
(see copy of the letter to the clerk accompanying the objection, attached hereto as part of Exhibit 
b); 
8. The objection was not literally filed and stamped by the Clerk of the Court until 
November 6,1997; 
9. Judge Frederick signed the prof Summary Judgment on November 3, 1997 ~ 
before the time to object had even run. 
Consequently, it was error for Judge Frederick to execute the order granting the Pasquin 
Defendants summary judgment on November 3,1997, then to rule in the November 18,1997 
minute entry that Mrs. Pasquin's objection was untimely, and then to deny Mrs. Pasquin's 
motion for reconsideration. 
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VII. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO 
DENY MRS. PASQUIN'S RULE 56(F) MOTIONS 
At the time that the subject motions for summary judgment were filed, the Pasquin 
Defendants had not produced any documents nor submitted themselves for deposition. The 
requested but not produced documents and other discovery were likely highly relevant to these 
motions. Mrs. Pasquin had not delayed nor refused to engage in discovery. She had merely 
graciously acquiesced in the Pasquin Defendants' requests to postpone discovery until John 
Pasquin's health improved. Rule 56(f) provides that if a party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment asserts that he or she really needs certain discovery to be able to fully and fairly oppose 
a motion for summary judgment, a ruling on the summary judgment should be postponed until 
the requested discovery is undertaken and/or completed. 
Only the Pasquin Defendants have the corporate and other business documents. Mrs. 
Pasquin cannot rebut their claims that there are "no documents" supporting her claims without 
being able to review the Pasquin Defendants' documents. This was the classic case where Rule 
56(f) should be employed and relief granted. It was an abuse of discretion and clear error for 
Judge Frederick to rule that Mrs. Pasquin was not entitled to Rule 56(f) relief because she could 
have undertaken discovery but did not. This purported "fact" was simply untrue. 
At the very least, the orders granting summary judgment should be reversed and Mrs. 
Pasquin given the opportunity to pursue and complete her requested and critically relevant 
discovery. Mrs. Pasquin should thereafter be allowed to supplement her oppositions as she sees 
fit, and then the motions can be ruled upon. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff/appellant Geri Pasquin respectfully requests that this 
Court (1) reverse Judge Frederick's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
in their entirety, or (2) reverse that portion of Judge Frederick's orders granting summary 
judgment as to the claims not automatically resolved by the Statute of Frauds challenge, or (3) 
reverse Judge Frederick's ruling regarding the timeliness of objections and the computation of 
time with respect thereto, and/or (4) at the very least, set aside the orders granting summary 
judgment, find that Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion should have been granted, and directing 
that the motions not be ruled upon until the requested relevant discovery is completed and Mrs. 
Pasquin has had an opportunity to supplement her oppositions accordingly. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 1998. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,I&L I hereby certify that on the day of 
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be X ( 
hand-delivered by fax and/or by courier; addressed to 
I caused two true and 
ed, postage prepaid; and/or 
Kipp & Christian, P.C. 
Attn: Carman E. Kipp 
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
FAX 359-9004 
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey 
Attn: Steven L. Taylor 
124 South 600 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FAX 533-8508 
Robert Copier 
243 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FAX 531-7928 
>£p<3~— 
40 
ADDENDA/EXHIBITS 
A -- Third-Party Affidavits Re Oral Agreements 
B — Copies of Letters/FAX Confirmation Sheets re 
Mrs. Pasquin's Service of Her Objection to the 
Propose Order Granting Summary Judgment to 
The Pasquin Defendants 
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Exhibit A 
Third-Party Affidavits Re Oral Agreements 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTIE DAWN MADSEN 
I, Kristie Dawn Madsen, under penalty of perjury I declare the following: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah, and if called to testify at trial would state the 
following of my own personal knowledge. 
2. I first met Kory Pasquin in August of 1994 when he came to Madsen Transport, 
where I worked at that time, to borrow a fork lift. Shortly thereafter I began to date Mr. Pasquin. 
Soon we became intimate and off and on lived together until his death in October 1996. I 
became pregnant with Mr. Pasquin child, and gave birth to his daughter on February 5, 1996, 
who I named Karly. I lived in the apartment at Quality Parts from March of 1996 until October 
of 1996. Some of my personal belongings are still located at Quality Parts. I worked at Quality 
Parts in April and May of 1996. 
3. During this relationship, Mr. Pasquin talked often about his business. Quality 
Parts, and his relationship with his father, John Pasquin, and mother, Geri Pasquin. During these 
conversations, Mr. Pasquin told me that John and Geri were his partners and had helped him 
build up the business. He said numerous times that the business would never have been 
successful without John and Geri. He told me that John was not "business oriented" enough to 
run the business, and that without Geri handling the office and other business affairs they would 
never have been successful. He told me that his goal was to build the business up to the point 
that he could sell it so that Geri, from her share of the three-way split of the proceeds of the sale, 
would be able to retire. Mr. Pasquin told me that he would probably keep the building for 
retirement but keep working. 
4. When I was at Quality Parts, I saw and heard John and Kory talking about 
business decisions many times, during which one or the other would say that they had "better 
talk to Geri" to get her opinion and vote on the matter. I saw the three of them often meet to 
discuss and decide business matters. It was always clear to me that John, Kory and Geri were 
equal partners, with equal say and influence in the business. At no time did I ever see John say 
or do anything which suggested in any way that Geri was not an equal partner, or did not have an 
equal vote, in the business. This was true both before and after the business was incorporated. 
In witness whereof I set my hand this 7th day of March, 1997. 
My Commission Expires: 
/ % s / oft, #Cto 
Exhibit B 
Copies of Letters/FAX Confirmation Sheets re 
Mrs. Pasquin's Service of Her Objection to the 
Propose Order Granting Summary Judgment to 
The Pasquin Defendants 
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BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN 
A Profatsloaal Law Corporation 
Laird U w Office: P1«M 7-21 Law Office: 
1600 Laird Avenue 675 E«§t 2100 South, Suit* 350 
Salt Lak* City, Utah I410S Silt Uka City, Utah S4106 
{101)5814737 (§01)481=3707 
Pax 512-4737 Fax 415-7140 
November 3, 1997 
Third District Court, Division I 
Salt Lake Department 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re* Geri Pasquin v John Pasquin; Jimmie Pasquin: The Estate of Koiy Pasquin: 
Quality Parts, a Utah general partnership, et al 
Case No 970900011CV 
Dear Clerk. 
Enclosed for filing you will find the original Objection to Proposed Summary 
Judgement of the Pasquin Defendants, for the above referenced case. 
Please conform the copy of the Notice and send the document, to our office in the self-
addressed, stamped envelope I have provided for your convenience. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our office. 
Sincerely, 
Melisar Hansen 
Legal Assistant 
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